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Heterogeneity among Developing Countries
Both developed and developing countries are heterogeneous in
terms of their own trade policies, the trade barriers they face, and
their net agricultural trade positions. The first two points are illus-
trated through a comparison of the duties applied by each country,
relative to the world average, versus the duties levied on their
exports. Among the developing countries, some face high export
tariffs (for example, Argentina, Brazil, Malawi, Uruguay, and
Zimbabwe) and many others impose relatively high tariffs on their
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W
hat is at stake in the standoff between the United States and Europe over agricul-
ture in the Doha Round of trade talks at the World Trade Organization (WTO)?
What impact would an agreement based on greater or lesser levels of ambition have on
developing countries, whose economies depend heavily on agriculture? Two years after the
WTO talks broke down in Cancún, reform of the heavily protected and subsidized agricul-
tural sectors of the United States and Europe remains a major impediment to progress.
Using the MIRAGE computable general equilibrium model of the global economy,1 in this
policy brief we compare different scenarios for the Doha agriculture negotiations, taking real
numbers from the proposals currently on the table from the European Union (EU), the
United States, and the G20 group of developing countries.
The first scenario models the global trade and welfare impacts of a cooperative reform
outcome, combining the most ambitious components of the U.S. and EU negotiating
proposals to reach a new set of disciplines under each of the agricultural pillars—market
access, export competition, and domestic support—and in manufacturing. This scenario
includes trade reform in least developed countries (LDCs) and development commitments,
such as the extension to LDCs of full Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) free-market access. The second scenario models a less ambitious
outcome, adopting the lower-end elements of the two proposals. The results for both
scenarios demonstrate the high stakes of this negotiation given the positions articulated by
the countries involved. A cooperative reform outcome by the United States and the EU—
based on the most ambitious components of their negotiating proposals—delivers 




1The MIRAGE model was developed at the Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII) in Paris. Full description of the model is
available at the CEPII web site (www.cepii.fr).imports (the developing countries generally impose higher than
average tariffs by global standards). In terms of agricultural trade,
both large net food importers and substantial food exporters exist
among middle-income countries (MICs) and LDCs. Given these
differences in policies and agricultural trade patterns, it is not
surprising that models such as MIRAGE forecast diverse trade
liberalization effects among countries; this is particularly so
because such models suggest that reform of agricultural policies
contributes a large portion of the total prospective gains.
U.S. and EU Agricultural Subsidies and Protection
Criticism has been directed at developed countries for protecting
and subsidizing agriculture, which stifles trade opportunities. The
United States and EU follow somewhat different regimes. The
United States has relatively low tariffs, but its agricultural subsidies
were increased in the most recent (2002) farm bill. The United
States provides relatively less preferential access than does the EU
for selected developing-country trade partners. The EU, in
contrast, has higher agricultural (but low industrial) tariffs and has
recently modified its policy of relatively high levels of agricultural
subsidies in favor of instruments that are less trade distorting than
in the past. The EU is also more active in granting preferential
market access. In these U.S.–EU policy differences lie the seeds of
different approaches to the Doha trade negotiations. 
Similarities and Differences in the U.S. and 
EU Proposals
The Doha negotiations may reach agreement on agriculture and
other provisions of a trade deal, but the outcome is far from
certain, and no proposal is complete on the eve of the Hong Kong
ministerial.2 The U.S. and EU proposals have some broad
commonalities, such as progressive tariff and domestic-support
cuts or the eventual elimination of export subsidies. But the
specifics of the proposals deviate on matters such as rates of
reduction of tariffs and domestic support or the number of
sensitive or special products (for developed and developing
countries, respectively) that will be subject to lesser disciplines. In
terms of an ambitious agenda for agricultural trade liberalization,
strong points of the U.S. proposal include sharper reductions in
bound tariff rates and a lower cap on maximum allowable tariffs;
few sensitive or special products; and moderately tough bindings
on domestic support that encourage decoupling of subsidies from
production. Strong points of the EU proposal in terms of trade
liberalization lie in the call for free access of LDCs to OECD
markets, a specific initiative for cotton to help West Africa, and a
push for lower industrial tariffs worldwide. 
What Difference Will the Doha Outcome Make?
What difference will the Doha Round’s outcome make to global
trade and welfare and to developing countries in particular? To
examine this question using numbers on the negotiating table,
we define a relatively ambitious cooperative reform scenario with
strong trade liberalization components from the U.S. and EU
proposals and contrast this with a less ambitious outcome drawn
from the lower-end elements (see Box 1).
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Box 1  Overview of Two Scenarios
AMBITIOUS SCENARIO
Tariffs
•  U.S. tariff formula for agriculture
•  Tariff caps in agriculture (developed countries,
75 percent; developing countries, 112.5 percent)
•  U.S. sensitive/special products clause (1 percent)
•  Tariff caps applied to sensitive/special products 
•  Swiss formula cuts for manufacturing tariffs
(developed-country coefficient, 8 percent; MIC
coefficient, 15 percent; LDC coefficient, 25 percent)
•  EU proposal of free OECD access for LDCs




•  EU tariff formula for agriculture
•  Higher agricultural tariff caps (developed countries,
150 percent; developing countries, 225 percent)
•  EU sensitive/special products clause (8 percent)
•  Caps not applied to sensitive/special products
•  Swiss formula cuts for manufacturing tariffs
(developed-country coefficient, 10 percent; MIC
coefficient, 20 percent)
•  LDCs do not reduce their import duties
•  No additional free OECD access for LDCs
Domestic support levels remain unchanged
Export subsidies are eliminated 
2Aspects of the evolving offers are widely reported in public and industry press. One publicly available source is the web site of the International
Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development.On market access, our ambitious proposal includes most
elements of the U.S. formula. Furthermore, it adds the EU
proposal of giving free access in OECD markets to LDCs, and it
imposes tariff caps on sensitive/special products. Finally, export
subsidies are eliminated and applied trade-distorting domestic
support is cut by 20 percent.3
In contrast to the ambitious scenario, our unambitious
scenario adopts the EU formula for less deep
tiered tariff cuts for agriculture and adds less liber-
alizing elements about caps, sensitive/special
products, Swiss formula in industry, and LDC
trade reform and market access. Export subsidies
are eliminated, but no cuts are assumed in applied
domestic support.
Model Structure 
The MIRAGE model is a multi-sector, multi-
region computable general equilibrium model
devoted to trade policy analysis. The model has a
sequential dynamic setup with fixed technology.
We report results for 2019: a 14-year horizon after
initiation in 2006 of reforms assumed to take
place over 5 years among developed countries and
10 years among developing countries. The
geographical decomposition allows focus on the
assessment of trade liberalization effects on devel-
oping countries (33 of 41 regions modeled),
including the heterogeneity that could contribute
to potential gainers and possible losers from a
Doha liberalization agreement.
The sector decomposition emphasizes key
sectors where distortions are high and numerous.
Agriculture is the main focus: of the 18 sectors
considered, 10 are agricultural. In the version of
MIRAGE used herein, unskilled labor is imper-
fectly mobile between agricultural and nonagricul-
tural activities. We utilize the latest GTAP 6
database, which enables tariffs to be built up for
the model sectors from the detailed MacMap-
HS6 data set.4 Tariff formulae are applied on
bound duties at the HS6 level. This allows
“binding overhang” phenomena (bound tariffs
higher than applied tariffs), which are quite large
in developing countries, to be taken into account.
Finally, as the MacMap-HS6 database includes all
the regional agreements and preferential schemes
prevailing in 2001, our modeling exercise fully
reflects the loss of preferential access. 
Results for the Ambitious versus Unambitious 
Doha Outcomes
Summary results for our ambitious and unambitious scenarios are
shown in Tables 1 and 2 and Figures 1 through 3. As a bench-
mark, we also report the outcomes of a MIRAGE simulation of












Full Liberalization –5.4 12.1 157
Ambitious Doha Outcome
Compared to full liberalization 
–2.2 4.1 104
Unambitious Doha Outcome


















Gain or loss as percent of base level
Middle Income (MICs)
   Argentina 1.2 0.3 0.2




   Chile 0.3 0.2
   China –0.1 0.0 0.4
   India 0.3 0.3 0.3
   Thailand 5.2 2.7 0.6
   Venezuela -0.5 – 0.3 –0.3
   Vietnam 3.3 0.9 0.5
   Zimbabwe 3.1 1.0 0.3
Least Developed (LDCs)
   Bangladesh    –0.5 0.9 0.2
   Madagascar –0.3 0.0 –0.2
   Malawi 11.9 6.0 0.2
   Mozambique    –0.2 0.0 –0.2
   Rest of Sub-Saharan Africa   0.0 0.1 0.0
   Tanzania 0.7 0.3 0.1
0.1    Uganda 0.5 0.2
   Zambia –0.6 –0.2 –0.1
Table 2   Effects of Liberalization on Real Income of Selected 
Developing Countries
Source: Authors’ calculations.
3These cuts apply to the domestic supports that can be clearly related to output or input incentive prices, but some controversial subsidies such as
price-linked U.S. countercyclical payments or direct fixed payments based on historical production are not restricted in our model.
4Full descriptions of MacMaps and the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) are also available at the CEPII and GTAP web sites (www.cepii.fr and
www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu).With full liberalization, world protection—
averaging 5.4 percent in agriculture and
manufacturing as measured by a weighted
aggregate statistic—is eliminated, world
trade expands by 12.1 percent in 2019
compared with the level estimated by the
model without liberalization, and the total
annual real income (welfare) gain worldwide
is $157 billion.5 Most of this gain accrues
to OECD countries, which account for
nearly 80 percent of world real income and
obtain a similar share of the gains from
trade liberalization. Thus, developed
countries have good reason to take the lead
in adopting an ambitious trade-liberalization
agenda. Full liberalization is also slightly
progressive. For developing countries as a
group, the share of welfare gains is greater
than their share of world income. But results
differ widely among individual countries, and
even the aggregate gain is small for the
LDCs. These results do not include any
dynamic gains from enhanced technology
that may be associated with increased trade
openness. 
The unambitious scenario leads to global real-income gains of
only US$41.5 billion, just 26 percent of the gain from full liberal-
ization. World protection measured by the weighted aggregate
statistic declines by 1.4 percent, also 26 percent of the decline
(to zero protection) with full liberalization. World trade expands 
2.0 percent under the unambitious scenario, 16 percent of the
gain from full liberalization. Thus the unambitious scenario moves
the global economy about 25 percent or less of the way toward the
full liberalization outcome.
A substantially greater movement is observed under the
ambitious scenario. Global welfare increases by US$103.7 billion,
66 percent of the gain from full liberalization. World protection
falls by 2.2 percent (41 percent of the effect of full liberalization),
and trade expands by 4.1 percent (34 percent of the full liberaliza-
tion effect). Much of these gains come from lower agricultural
protection in wealthy countries, whereas little reduction in applied
agricultural protection results among developing countries. Under
the ambitious scenario, the gain in world real income is propor-
tionately much larger than the reduction of average protection
because this scenario greatly reduces the dispersion of tariffs
among products in rich countries, due to constraining caps and
the limited number of sensitive products. 
The heterogeneity among developing countries is illustrated
by divergence in the real-income effects of the alternative liberal-
ization scenarios (see Table 2). In terms of individual developing
MICs that might benefit from trade liberalization, the unambi-
tious scenario delivers very little real-income gain for two reasons.
First, these countries gain little from improved “terms of trade”
(prices of their exports compared with imports) in world markets
despite the reduced protection among wealthy countries. Second,
they gain little from “allocation efficiency” (realignment of
resource use within their economies) largely because they make so
few changes to their own policies. The same results occur for the
LDCs that might gain from trade liberalization—terms-of-trade
gains and allocation efficiency gains are very small under the
unambitious scenario. For those developing countries (both MICs
and LDCs) that potentially would not benefit from trade liberal-
ization, under full liberalization terms-of-trade losses (of food
importers and exporters facing preference erosion) offset their
gains from improved allocation efficiency. Both impacts are
dampened under the unambitious scenario compared with full liber-
alization, with terms-of-trade losses small enough to more than
offset loss of allocation efficiency gains, so welfare losses are smaller
for these countries.
Under the ambitious scenario, developing countries gain
more from trade reform. Among the MICs, gains in real income
tend to be about one-third of those under full liberalization. Both
terms-of-trade gains (or losses) and allocation efficiency gains are
larger under the ambitious scenario than under the unambitious
scenario, but they remain less than in the case of full liberalization.
The impact of the two scenarios on market access are illus-
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Figure 1 Agricultural protection before and after a potential Doha 
agreement, rich countries—applied duties
Source: Authors’ calculations.
5A widely cited recent World Bank model by Kym Anderson, Will Martin, and Dominique van der Mensbrugghe puts the annual worldwide welfare
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Figure 2 Agricultural protection before and after a potential Doha agreement, middle-income 
countries—applied duties
Source: Authors’ calculations.scenario implies a much larger liberalization in rich countries
where protection is initially high and unevenly distributed (the
rest of OECD, developed Asia, and the EU). The binding
overhang phenomenon is so large in developing countries that
even the ambitious scenario has a mitigated impact in agricultural
protection except in China and Thailand.
Concluding Remarks
In this brief we have presented initial results from an analysis of an
ambitious versus an unambitious Doha negotiation outcome. We
base our simulations on numbers from proposals recently put on
the table, but not agreed on going into the Hong Kong WTO
ministerial meeting, and compared those outcomes with our
estimated effects of full global trade liberalization.
The results for the two Doha scenarios demonstrate the high
stakes of this negotiation given the positions articulated by the
countries involved. A successful round could deliver real gains
both globally and for developing countries. However the
magnitude of those gains depends on the shape of the agreement.
A cooperative reform outcome by the United States and the EU—
based on the most ambitious components of their negotiating
proposals—delivers noticeably more benefits than an unambitious
outcome based on the lower-end elements of the two proposals.
The details matter in the differing proposals, such as the tariff and
domestic support reduction formulae, tariff caps, and number of
sensitive and special products. Both negotiating commitment and
diligence will be needed to avoid a hollow Doha outcome given
the technical character of these details.
Developing countries are heterogeneous in terms of their own
policies, the trade barriers they face, and their net agricultural
trade. Overall, developing countries gain most—and might
achieve the best deal in the negotiations—from a global trade
agreement when they join in the reform process. Attention is
needed in the case of some of the LDCs and other poor countries
that may face declining terms of trade due to higher world agricul-
tural prices or eroding preferences. In addition, many developing
countries can achieve the full benefits of trade only with substan-
tial attention to broad development needs that will enhance their
competitiveness. This too needs to be part of a successful Doha
outcome.
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